Windows Internals: Research Notes from the 6th to 7th Edition
Windows
Internals: Research Notes from the 6th to 7th Edition
The Path Toward Clarity in the Increasing
Complexity, Challenges, and Evolution of Modern Computing
“To
understand the immeasurable, the mind must be extraordinarily quiet, still.”
— Jiddu Krishnamurti
Seeker(李标明) ·
@clibm079
China · Independent Malware Analyst &
Researcher
From 2026.07.27 to 2026.08.10
Prologue: Curiosity-driven,
keep moving
I
had a special feeling during that quite exploration stage about malware samples
in history, which let me be aware of my limited knowledge, and I still did not deeply
understand the real evolution of modern computing, to me, there was a big
challenge without the map of mental model, the profesional knowledge is not
systemtical, this mades me continueously explorate the path of clarity.
With
the above pure original thinking and to build the mental model, I took a short
break and improved and updated my personal website with a dated research
archive. and sometimes for making a record with short videos about Windows
internals. And then continued to read the books Windows internals 7 Part 1 and Part
2.
In
fact, From september 2025, I had aready made a plan and started to learn
Windows internals 6 Part 1, it means that by now, It has almost took me one
years to read the books from Windows internals 6 (Part 1 and Part 2) to 7 (Part
1 and Part 2), it’s really a long time to study and understand; I had to slow
down and follow the pace. And I was happy to gain a lot of things during the
time and learn more useful things from other people in the global cyber community.
Thanks so much! Besides the knowledge, the one important thing is that I start
to form my new reading strategy. The long-term habit of diving deeper details in
the past was dangerous, and now I have changed it and improved it.
Here,
I would like to make a record with my personal observation and understanding of
the process of reading. It is a wide topic, but to pick my personal perspective
as a malware analyst and researcher, it’s very limited thinking and exploration.
The Evolution from
Traditional to Modern Computing
First, let’s simply have a look at and compare
the architecture of the “Windows Internals 6th Edition era” with modern
Windows. The most significant evolution is the integration of the hypervisor
layer.
Figure 1.1: Simplified Windows architecture
comparison (Source from the books Windows Internals 6 and 7).
It is well known that computers are
designed with a structured, layered architecture. In my personal perspective,
the biggest evolution is from “The operating system controls the computer.” to
“The operating system is one layer in a larger computing stack.” as follows:
Figure 1.2: A simplified version:
a mental model for the runtime stack from traditional to modern computing.
VBS Architecture
and Windows Kernel Security Evolution
And virtualization-based security architecture
goes further. The hypervisor is the ultimate authority for memory isolation
between VTLs. VL0 is the normal Windows environment,
and VL1 is the more trusted environment. The normal Windows kernel (VTL0)
cannot directly access VTL1 memory.
Figure 2.1: Source from windows
internals 7th edition part 1: Windows 10 and Server 2016 VBS architecture.
Connecting with the previous mental model,
modern computing techniques runtime stack becomes the following:
Figure 2.2: A simplified version: a modern
Windows Internals goes beyond the classic architecture.
In my view, the evolution of modern
Windows security involves multiple layers of protection, including CFG, HVCI,
and Code Integrity. The major architectural change is the introduction of
virtualization-based security (VBS), which extends the Windows security
architecture by separating normal kernel execution from security-sensitive
components through virtualization-based isolation. In
short, VBS reorganized the Windows security architecture by placing selected
security-critical components into a virtualization-isolated environment while
keeping normal Windows execution in VTL0.
The old Windows model: the kernel was the
ultimate trust boundary. That is called "game over" if the kernel is
compromised. But the modern Windows model is no longer the only highest-trust
software layer.
Obviously, that is the awareness of risk,
and I would like to describe it this way: Don't put all your eggs in one
basket. Yes, the deeper principle is: Do not rely on a single security
boundary. Build multiple independent layers of protection.
And one important thing being changing is:
the kernel’s knowledge becomes the key fundametal to the modern computing
research, not the highest trust layer, it is just one layer’s knowledge need to
study, the learning curves are steeper, it menas more challenging, more
patience and more time.
Not only that, but when I noted that the
tool developed HyprDbg v.01 was released, a
list hook like this is a reminder of how much deep knowledge modern systems
demand. It demands a solid understanding of:
Ø CPU architecture and privileged instructions
Ø Paging and EPT
Ø VMX/VT-x and the VMCS
Ø Windows kernel internals
Ø Exception handling and interrupt delivery
Figure 2.3: Source from GitHub HyperDbg.
If we are back to the history about “Blue
Pill” in 2006, the virtualization technique disscussion, until now, as we know,
it is a long time, still exploring. It’s not easy to understand the whole
evolution and improvement; it’s not a quick win behind the deeper knowledge and
practice.
People often say: security is asymmetric:
defenders must protect everything, while attackers need only one path. Yes, the
direction of operation and final output are right.
But from the above evolution and
observation, in my opinion, mastery in modern computing is symmetric in the
deep-dive low-level security research direction—on both sides, it would take
many years of study, practice, patience, and continual learning. For this
reason, it’s equal.
UEFI: Establishing
the Root of Trust and Expanding the Attack Surface
Let’s first have a look at the mental
model from legacy BIOS to modern UEFI.
Figure 3.1: A simplified version:
a mental model from BIOS to modern UEFI.
The evolution is not only "BIOS was
replaced by UEFI." The deeper change is that firmware became part of the
trusted computing architecture. The biggest change brought by UEFI is that it
transformed firmware from a simple hardware initialization program into a
security and platform management layer.
Figure 3.2: Source from windows internals 7th
edition part 2: CHAPTER 12 Startup and shutdown.
As we know, they are two sides of the same
coin. The positive side: UEFI improved security. But the negative side:
Anything that executes before Windows becomes a high-value target. Let’s have a
look at how UEFI bootkits created a new attack surface as follows:
Figure 3.3: Source from Ben Gurion
University: UEFI Memory Forensics:A Framework for UEFI Threat Analysis
From the above table we can observe the
fact: a new security strategy also creates a new attack surface. When adding a
new strategy, the system becomes more sophisticated, and the learning curves
also become steeper. And the new attacking method discovered when deeply
understanding goes on.
As we know, simple is best, but modern
computing, and nowadays become very complex.
CPU
Microarchitecture: Expanding the Security Boundary Beyond Software
The part is a really deep concept to
study. The two most destructive and effective hardware-side-channel attacks
were named Meltdown and Spectre. Let’s simply introduce them.
Meltdown: KVA (kernel virtual address)
Shadow is a Windows kernel memory-management mitigation implemented in VTL0. It
was introduced to mitigate Meltdown, which allowed a malicious user-mode
process to speculatively read privileged kernel memory that should have been
inaccessible.
Spectre: Retpoline demonstrates how
compiler-generated code can become a critical part of CPU security by
mitigating indirect branch attacks in the Windows kernel and drivers.
Maybe many people initially think security
is mainly as follows:
Figure 4.1: Maybe many people
think security.
Modern Windows security is not only about
APIs and kernel objects. It also depends on how the compiler generates
instructions and how the CPU executes those instructions internally. This is one of the most important mindset
shifts when moving from traditional malware analysis toward systems security
research.
Modern security goes further; it starts at the application layer and goes
downward and is focused on runtime execution as follows:
Figure 4.2: Modern security goes
further about mitigation with Meltdown and Spectre.
As we see, every layer can influence
security. Maybe a quick reading might produce: “Spectre abuses speculative
execution. Retpoline fixes it.” But deeper understanding requires connecting
many concepts as follows:
Figure 4.3: many concepts.
As we see, each step depends on the
previous one. That is a major conceptual shift. It took me more than one week
to build a deeper model of how computers’ instructions actually execute. This
is a major conceptual shift as follows:
Figure 4.4:A mental model of the
instruction executes.
In my personal perspective, for low-level
topics like Spectre, Meltdown, Retpoline, and CPU speculation, the most
valuable outcome is not memorising every technical detail. I may never directly
work on microarchitecture analysis or CPU-side-channel research, but
understanding these topics can still have significant value because really
expand and improve my mental model from software protection to the entire
computing stack.
Observation on my
personal perspective
From the above observation, modern
computing moved from an operating-system-centric model to a platform-security
model, where firmware, hardware, virtualization, and the OS cooperate to create
a trusted execution environment. Modern
Windows security requires understanding not only applications and the kernel,
but also compiler behavior and the CPU execution model.
The
following two-part mental model explains the evolution from Windows Internals
6th Edition to 7th Edition:
Figure 5: A simplified version: A
mental model from Windows Internals 6th edition to 7th
edition.
In my personal view, the security boundary
spans multiple layers, for modern low-level security research, cross-layer
reasoning ability is becoming essential. But it doesn’t mean that one master
each layer; it’s very difficult.
And to face the evolution, one thing must
be sure: Modern computing is removing old boundaries; it requires a broader
mental model. Making the mental model shift from the legacy to the modern
malware era.
The more challenge
and value of community
Besides the deeper knowledge, another challenge
is: Those elite-tier APT groups had mastered Windows internals very well many
years ago in the legacy computing era. And nowadays, to be honest, I’m not sure
right now what level they’ve advanced to. But one thing I’m very confident in
is that the professional knowledge they deep-dive into would shock most people,
as they shocked many experts many years ago. From
a purely technical design perspective rather than an attack or destruction
perspective, their advanced skill and professional knowledge let me know that I
have been far behind them. And the limited knowledge and curiosity makes me learn
more and deeper, and one important thing is to keep being humble. Especially
moving to modern computing, It is not just about recognising how little I know
but also about facing complexity and understanding it takes time and patience.
And now In my personal perspective, AI is
on fire; the industry is spending billions on AI-driven tools to speed up
observation, It's useful for automated triaging, handling massive attacks, and
high-speed incident responses. But human-depth malware reports explored by the
public are becoming rare in the global community, which is the new blind spot
and challenge and crisis and also creates more opportunities for high-tier threat
actors. The balancing between them is not an option.
It’s not too bad; those challenges go with
a positive side. I am very happy to see in the global community so many people
would like to share what they do, what they discover and more. On the stage of quiet
exploration, the community inspires me a lot, and I am lucky to have the chance
to touch and connect. One important thing is to observe the
changing, which makes me think more and improves myself. Thank you!
And here, thanks to everybody in the
windows internals books by Pavel Yosifovich, Mark E. Russinovich, David A.
Solomon, Alex Ionescu. I really
understood the process of writing a book, each step and every moment, and
everything came from their family’s support; it was very important and
significant. I think it would be very hard for me to expand the perspective
from scratch without their contributions. The study of Windows Internals 6th
and 7th Editions shaped my mental model of modern Windows security. I
appricated everything. Thank you!
And thanks to the all references, and thanks
to everybody from HyperDbg and Ben Gurion University, whose contributions also helped me
expand my personal perspective of malware research and became the important
part of this article. Thank you!
And finally, to be honest, these research
notes are just the limited understanding on the current stage of exploration; I
still need to continuously update my knowledge and recognition and hope to
learn more and gain practical experience. Yes, it is a continuous journey of
understanding.
References
[1]. https://www.amazon.com/Windows-Internals-Part-architecture-management/dp/0735684189
[2]. https://www.amazon.com/Windows-Internals-Part-2-7th/dp/0135462401
[3]. https://github.com/HyperDbg/HyperDbg/releases?page=4
[4]. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Pill_%28software%29
[5]. https://arxiv.org/html/2501.16962v2
[6]. https://malwareanalysisspace.blogspot.com/2025/10/revisiting-subvirt-blue-pill-from.html
Epilogue:
What This Exploration Taught Me
1.
Recording
complex matters at the right moment—summarizing them and writing them
down—helps me save time in the long run.
2.
Not
every study needs an immediate application. Some studies build the framework or
mental model that makes future understanding possible.
3.
Sometimes,
If Windows Internals feels harder, you would change your reading strategy.
Annotation: In all the sentences I wrote and used the word
“you or your or yourself” in, it talked to me or “the malware sample itself,
especially in my poem I did”, not the reader. I must clarify my motivation.
End of Report
──────────────────────
Seeker(李标明) · @clibm079
China · Independent Malware
Analyst & Researcher

















0 Comments:
Post a Comment
Subscribe to Post Comments [Atom]
<< Home